Dignity Takings and “Trailer Trash”: The Case Of Mobile Home Park Mass Evictions by Sullivan, Esther
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 92
Issue 3 Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration Article 12
3-6-2018
Dignity Takings and “Trailer Trash”: The Case Of
Mobile Home Park Mass Evictions
Esther Sullivan
University of Colorado Denver
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Housing Law Commons, Land Use Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real
Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Esther Sullivan, Dignity Takings and “Trailer Trash”: The Case Of Mobile Home Park Mass Evictions, 92 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 937 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol92/iss3/12
937
DIGNITY TAKINGS AND “TRAILER TRASH”: THE CASE OF 
MOBILE HOME PARK MASS EVICTIONS
ESTHER SULLIVAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
A tenuous right to place is a lived reality for millions of low-income 
residents in America’s manufactured home communities, commonly called 
mobile home or “trailer” parks.1 Mobile home parks have an ugly reputation 
in the United States: the home of seedy trailers and seedier “trailer trash” 
residents. They are often invisible, hidden behind tall walls and Walmart 
parking lots. Yet, mobile home parks matter immensely both for the poor 
and for the people who own and covet the land where parks are built. In fact, 
manufactured housing is the single largest source of unsubsidized affordable 
housing in the United States, with about 18 million people living in mobile 
homes and one third of these living within mobile home parks.2 In mobile 
home parks, residents own their homes but rent the lots where the homes are 
located. The lack of legal right to the land under residents’ homes makes 
park properties ripe for redevelopment, as developers purchase these large 
tracts of land for other uses and legally evict entire communities with as little 
* Assistant Professor, University of Colorado Denver College of Liberal Arts and Sciences. The author 
can be reached at esther.sullivan@ucdenver.edu.
1. A note on terminology: The term “manufactured home” technically refers to an industrially-
produced home fabricated after 1976 when the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
introduced manufactured home performance standards and the term “mobile home” refers to a home 
manufactured before 1976. In practice, however, the two terms are synonyms used to describe a prefab-
ricated home of at least 320 square feet that is attached to a permanent chassis. Manufactured Home 
Construction and Safety Standards, 24 C.F.R. § 3280.2 (2017). This definition distinguishes mobile/man-
ufactured homes from other forms of modular housing that are assembled on site. The term manufactured 
home is preferred by industry representatives and some housing advocates in attempts to increase the 
marketability of the homes or to downplay the notion that they are transient structures. Residents in this 
study were far more likely to use the problematic term “trailer,” though they also frequently used “mobile 
home.” I follow architectural historians in using the common term “mobile home,” not only because 
“manufactured home” was never used by a single resident participating in this study, but also because the 
term “conveys better than any other the basic hybrid character of the innovation and the essential basis 
for the conflicts it has engendered.” ALLAN D. WALLIS, WHEEL ESTATE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF 
MOBILE HOMES, at viii (1991)*.
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as thirty days’ notice in some states.3 These mass evictions occur with such 
frequency that U.S. housing advocates have warned the country is currently 
experiencing an “epidemic of [park] closures.”4
This article examines this defining feature of contemporary life in mo-
bile home parks: mass evictions that displace entire communities when parks 
are redeveloped. I analyze these mass evictions through the lens of dignity 
takings. Bernadette Atuahene’s work provides a useful framework for think-
ing beyond the immediate practical and financial difficulties of eviction and 
forced relocation, to understand community dispossession in mobile home 
parks as an ongoing dignity taking.5 Drawing on in-depth ethnography con-
ducted over two years living inside closing mobile home parks in Florida and 
Texas, I trace the legal and spatial forces that shape mobile home park resi-
dency, and provide an up-close window into the catalytic moments when 
mobile home residents are evicted en masse. In mobile home parks, dignity 
taking reproduces cultural understandings of mobile home residents as mar-
ginal and disposable and serves as a primary mechanism that structures their 
housing insecurity.
Understanding mobile home park housing insecurity through the lens 
of dignity takings is not only important to those living in mobile home parks, 
but to those interested more broadly in the experience of poverty and the 
security of affordable housing in the United States Mobile homes are a pri-
mary way we house the nation’s poor.6 Manufactured housing is not only the 
largest source of unsubsidized affordable housing but also the fastest-grow-
ing form of new housing in the United States.7 The last three decades have 
seen a steady increase in mobile home residency.8 Throughout the 1990s, 
manufactured housing represented two-thirds of the new affordable housing 
produced.9 The use of manufactured housing is concentrated among low-
income Americans. Nationally, seventy-five percent of households living in 
3. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PROTECTING FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS IN COMMUNITIES 3–4
(2010).
4. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PROMOTING RESIDENT OWNERSHIP OF COMMUNITIES 1 (2015).
5. See generally BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH 
AFRICA’S LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM, at vii–viii (2014).
6. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., PROMOTING RESIDENT OWNERSHIP OF COMMUNITIES 1 (2017).
7. Paola Scommegna, Study Finds U.S. Manufactured-Home Owners Face ‘Quasi-Homeless-
ness,’ POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Oct. 2004), http://www.prb.org/Publications/Arti-
cles/2004/StudyFindsUSManufacturedHomeOwnersFaceQuasiHomelessness.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/T8Y4-WQSJ].
8. General Industry Information, MANUFACTURED HOUS. INST., http://www.manufacturedhous-
ing.org/research-and-data [https://perma.cc/KQX9-R6ML].
9. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 6, at 1.
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mobile homes earn less than $50,000 a year, with a median annual household 
income of $28,400 in 2013.10
For the large portion of mobile home residents living in mobile home
parks, the threat of dispossession is literally inscribed into the land under 
their homes. About one-third of the nation’s mobile homes are located in 
land-lease mobile home parks where residents own their home but rent their 
lot.11 Indeed eighty percent of mobile home park residents own their homes 
but only fourteen percent own the land beneath them, effectively placing 
them “at the whim of property owners.”12 This unique form of land tenure, 
referred to as “divided asset ownership”13 is central in constructing both the 
housing affordability and housing insecurity that exists in mobile home 
parks. Without rights to the land under their homes, mobile home park resi-
dents are halfway homeowners.14 Their housing security depends on the de-
cisions of private landlords. Ultimately, park residents, even those who have 
long owned their homes, can legally be evicted at any time when parks are 
sold or closed.15 This ethnography takes place inside mobile home parks be-
fore, during, and after residents were evicted and forced to relocate them-
selves and their homes.16 The parks described here, “Silver Sands” in Jupiter, 
Florida and “Trail’s End” in Alvin, Texas,17 had been in operation since the 
1950s and were home to stable communities of working class and poor 
home-owning residents who rented lots inside the parks for $200-$300 a 
month. This paper focuses on the experience of eviction from mobile home 
parks as a dignity taking and examines the immediate and longer term effects 




11. Cost and Size Comparison for Manufactured and Site Built Homes: 2007–2015, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/mhs/tables/time-series/sitebuiltvsmh.xls 
[https://perma.cc/3NWX-AHZM].
12. CONSUMERS UNION, MANUFACTURED HOUSING RENTAL COMMUNITY TENANTS RIGHTS 1
(2001).
13. Werner Z. Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, The Regulation of Immobile Housing Assets Under 
Divided Ownership, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 383, 383 (1999).
14. Esther Sullivan, Halfway Homeowners: Eviction and Forced Relocation in a Florida Manu-
factured Home Park, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 474, 474–97 (2014).
15. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 1.
16. All ethnographic and qualitative data, including direct quotes and field observations, were col-
lected by the author over two years from May 2012 through May 2014. The study collected data from 
180 people who lived or worked inside closing or potentially closing mobile home parks in Texas and 
Florida. In every park, in addition to written notes, I audio recorded all conversations and interactions 
relating to the relocation, which resulted in about 1,000 individual audio recordings and over 300 hours 
of MP3 files. I personally transcribed every hour of recordings and all interviews. Data and transcripts 
are available upon request.
17. The names of all parks and park residents are pseudonyms; the names of places are not.
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of dispossession tied to dehumanization that structured these residents’ ex-
perience of forced removal.
Constitutional takings occur when a state confiscates property against 
an owner’s will and pays adequate compensation.18 Atuahene redefines the 
concept of takings to include various types of involuntary property loss 
across a broader spectrum of displacement and dispossession.19 To do so she 
coined the concept dignity takings, which refers to state actions that deprive 
persons of property while simultaneously depriving them of dignity in the 
form of dehumanization, infantilization, or community destruction.20 Exam-
ining dignity takings in mobile home park properties requires not only an 
expanded conception of constitutional takings but also an expanded concep-
tion of the very definition of property.
The legal definition of property focuses on formal rights of ownership 
of land or chattel, in other words of real or personal property.21 For mobile 
home residents living in parks, the nature of “divided asset ownership” com-
plicates this legal definition.22 Understanding the divided nature of residents’ 
right to the property under their mobile homes is an important exercise in 
probing the role that the narrow legal definition of property plays in circum-
scribing understandings of property loss. Property scholars understand prop-
erty as the bundle of rights to possess, use, exclude, and transfer property.23
In the case of mobile home parks, residents’ rights to use their homes are in 
tension with landlords’ rights to transfer their properties. Landlords’ rights 
of transfer allow them to dispossess their tenants of the lots under their 
homes and forcibly evict both them and their mobile homes from communi-
ties where many have lived for decades. This is the unique space of the mo-
bile home park. As a place for owner-occupied housing, mobile home parks 
suggest permanence. As a space built on divided asset ownership, removal 
of residents is legal with the correct notice.24 As a result, the mobile home
park offers a perfect case to explore instances where the legal definition of 
property is disconnected from its social definition. It also offers an oppor-
tunity to better understand property loss in terms of the symbolic and social 
values property holds.
18. A. J. VAN DER WALT, CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY CLAUSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 399 
(1999).
19. ATUAHENE, supra note 5, at 3.
20. Bernadette Atuahene, Takings as a Sociolegal Concept: An Interdisciplinary Examination of 
Involuntary Property Loss, 12 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 171, 179 (2016).
21. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 750 (1998).
22. Hirsch & Rufolo, supra note 13, at 384–87.
23. Merrill, supra note 21, at 730.
24. See generally NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, at 2.
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Atuahene defines dignity takings as the actions by which “a state di-
rectly or indirectly destroys or confiscates property rights from owners or 
occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or 
infantilization.”25 Based on this definition, mobile home park mass evictions 
do not provide an example of dignity taking par excellence. Rather, the prop-
erty and dignity lost during mobile home park displacements offer important 
extensions of the concept. The following sections explore how the case of 
eviction in mobile home parks expands the definition of dignity takings in 
three ways. First, it expands understandings of property beyond legal defini-
tions to account for the practical experience of property ownership. Second, 
it expands understandings of property loss to account for the multiple values 
property can hold, which include not only economic but also social (emo-
tional, symbolic, and collective) values. Finally, it expands the understand-
ing of state actions to include not only the moment of taking itself, but also 
the regulatory actions that enshrine exclusionary and dehumanizing treat-
ment into law. In the case of the mobile home I show how dignity takings 
are codified in zoning laws and financing regulations and explore how these 
forms of state action structure the secondary, dehumanizing social status of 
trailer trash.
II. THE ECONOMIC LOGIC AND PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE OF PROPERTY
LOSS
In light of divided asset ownership, the challenge mobile homes pose to 
strictly legal definitions of property loss are twofold. First, mobile homes are 
not intended to be removed from property once installed. Removal can seri-
ously degrade or completely destroy the structural integrity of the home (and 
thus any value or accrued housing equity).26 Second, mobile homes are not 
seen as mobile by residents themselves, who experience their homes as per-
manent homes and their rental lots as part of the home. In this way, the legal 
definition of property ownership and the practical experience of property 
ownership diverge. This disconnect challenges ingrained understanding of 
involuntary property loss and can help to generate a fuller understanding of 
the value of property that extends beyond mere economic value.
The term mobile home is misleading. Contemporary mobile homes are 
highly immobile. Once set in place, their frames slacken and relocation can 
25. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical 
Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016).
26. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 3, at 1.
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result in serious structural damage.27 Pervasive cultural understandings of 
mobile homes highlight their mobility, and actors interested in redeveloping 
mobile home parks into other land uses capitalize on these cultural under-
standings. However, the Manufactured Housing Institute, the industry’s na-
tional trade organization, boasts that more than ninety percent of today’s 
manufactured homes never move from their original site.28 In truth, this es-
timate is misleading: when parks close, many homeowners are forced to 
abandon their homes. The cost of relocating a mobile home is prohibitive 
and can be more than the homeowner initially paid for the home. Estimates 
range from $5,000 to $10,000 with permitting and installation fees.29 This
cost represents a large share of both mobile home residents’ average low 
incomes and their accrued housing equity, five to seven years’ worth of ac-
crued equity one study estimated.30 While the mobile home industry is orga-
nized to depend on land-lease mobile home parks for the placement of the 
homes it prefabricates, the prefabrication of these homes is not designed to 
account for the insecure land tenure that is fundamental to land-lease ar-
rangements. Mobile homes are not designed or constructed to move after 
they are transported from the factory and installed in parks. Yet the parks 
where they are installed are structured such that homes can be forcibly re-
moved at any time.
This is further complicated because mobile homes become de facto tied 
to the land. Once put in place their structures slacken and degrade. In many 
cases they cannot be removed from the property and remain livable. Thus 
removal of the home effectively destroys the home and the homeowners ac-
crued housing equity. In other words, eviction from a property that does not 
legally belong to a resident destroys property that does. Like many of her 
neighbors, eighty-seven-year-old evicted Florida resident Stella, learned she 
would lose her home of twenty years because it was not structurally sound 
for relocation. Stella cut to the heart of divided asset ownership when she 
stressed: “I paid for it [the home]. I did all the repairs. The only thing it’s 
sitting on is the landlord’s dirt.”
Stella’s perception of her home exposes a fundamental difference be-
tween her understanding of formal definitions of property rights and her 
practical experience of property rights. For Stella and many other mobile 
home residents, her understanding of home extended beyond the four walls 
27. KEVIN JEWELL, CONSUMERS UNION, MANUFACTURED HOMEOWNERS WHO RENT LOTS LACK 
SECURITY OF BASIC TENANTS RIGHTS 1 (2001).
28. Frequently Asked Questions, MANUFACTURED HOUS. INST., http://www.manufacturedhous-
ing.org/faqs [https://perma.cc/7YA9-STPS].
29. NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., supra note 4, at 9.
30. See id.
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of her trailer to the property of the lot itself. Residents’ practical understand-
ing of property was evident in the care they took in the land around their 
homes, where the “landlord’s dirt” was a site of investment and cultivation.
While cultural understandings of mobile homes highlight their mobil-
ity, residents of mobile homes stress their permanence. Homeowners planted 
these grounds, cultivated gardens on them, and expanded their homes 
through built on decks, screened porches, additional bedrooms, and utility 
rooms. In the Florida mobile home I rented after its owners abandoned it in 
the face of their looming eviction, one of the rooms I utilized most was a 
built-on wood-working shop. The former owner had evidently done the 
same; the room was pristine and organized, but well used. It was the origin 
of many other additions and enhancements the homeowner had done inside 
the home. Like other extra rooms, porches, and additions that augmented the 
majority of homes in both Florida and Texas parks, this addition was made 
by the home’s former owner with the knowledge and approval of the land-
lord and with the expectation of enhancing future livability and home equity.
These additions and improvements, made outside the home on property 
that did not belong to residents, were nonetheless experienced as part of the 
home. During her eviction, Tabitha had difficulty distinguishing between her 
home and improvements made on her rented lot, even after she was informed 
by a mobile home relocation company that her porch addition was not part 
of her home and would not be relocated with the home:
So they are like, can’t you just live without a porch? And I’m like, if you 
bought a three-bedroom house and then was told that you could only have 
two of the bedrooms, what would you think? How would you feel? He 
said, how often did you sit out there? I said, that’s not the point, it was part 
of my house! I bought that place—that was one of the reasons that I bought 
that place, because I liked the house and I liked the porch. And I liked the 
location. Not that it was mine, but I felt it was part of the house. I thought 
it was part of the house. I felt it was part of the house. As if it was attached 
to the house.
Even in the final days of their eviction, residents continued to maintain 
their lots as if they were part of the home. Indeed, even residents who were 
forced to abandon their homes because they could not be relocated took pride 
in the home as they abandoned it. Only two days before he abandoned his 
home of five years and began three years of sleeping on the street, Randall 
was busy replacing one of the jalousie window panes that had been lost on 
his front door window. Humiliated, he knew that the home would likely be 
dismantled for scrap metal but he insisted on this small repair because he 
wanted the home to look “decent.” Similarly, when Betty turned over her 
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home to the developer that had purchased Silver Sands to build luxury apart-
ments, she noted: “Gosh it was spotless.” She even waxed her floors and 
washed her curtains. She abandoned the pristine home on its lot surrounded 
by the rows of lilies she had planted over the last two decades on grounds 
that did not legally belong to her.
During park closures, the residents, landlords, and park redevelopers 
involved in this study all articulated a clear understanding that the land under 
residents’ homes was owned by the park. However, in practice these resi-
dents cultivated, depended on, and imagined theses lots as their own. The 
practical experience of their home and community was based on an expecta-
tion of stability and permanence. Elderly residents in this study (a group dis-
proportionately represented in mobile home parks) often expressed the 
expectation that they would never again move in their lifetime, despite the 
formal understanding that they did not have rights to the land under their 
home. Richard, an elderly evicted Florida resident, said, “I thought that this 
would probably be my last home. I thought that I would probably die in this 
unit. (‘So when did you realize that you might have to move?’) When the 
notice came through telling me that I have six months to get the hell out of 
here.” Similarly, Ron, a seventy-year-old Florida resident, said, “I’ve lived 
here most of my life and now I have cancer and I’m going to die. I have 2 to 
5 years, I thought I was going to die here.” Ron was evicted before he died 
of cancer.
Scrutinizing the disconnect between residents’ expectation of perma-
nence and their formal lack of property rights helps us to understand the mul-
tiple values property can hold. For Atuahene, “a robust understanding of 
property’s multiple values is required to fully comprehend the magnitude of 
loss associated with takings.”31 From a sociological standpoint, this under-
standing emerges from a nuanced distinction between the use value and ex-
change value of place.32 Mobile home parks contain exchange value for 
landlords and property developers who have a vested interest in highlighting 
homeowners’ lack of legal claim to the property under their homes, but they 
also contain use value for residents whose everyday practical experience of 
home includes the land underneath them. This practical perception of prop-
erty is demonstrated not only in words but in deeds, as residents not only 
refer to their rented lot as their home but also expand and augment their 
homes within the confines of their lots, building and improving upon the land 
(with the landlord’s consent). This practical claim to property is expressed 
31. Atuahene, supra note 20, at 171.
32. JOHN R. LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
PLACE (1987).
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symbolically in the perimeters of shrubbery and landscaping that designate 
their lots. It is expressed emotionally in residents’ talk of their park as a for-
ever home. When scholars follow residents in viewing home this way they 
rescue the concept of property from being reduced to only its economic value 
and highlight the importance of its manifold emotional, symbolic, and social 
values.33
III. CONSTRUCTING TRAILER TRASH
If we proceed from the understanding that mobile home park residents
are deprived of property—both legally, as some lose their homes and accrued 
equity when mobile homes are not structurally sound for removal and sym-
bolically, as they are dispossessed of properties they cared for and counted 
on with an expectation of permanence—we can begin to understand the de-
humanizing processes that constitute their eviction as a dignity taking. Atua-
hene argues for a two-prong approach when examining whether the 
dehumanization or infantilization on which a dignity taking is based oc-
curred: 1) examining the intentions of parties responsible for the involuntary 
property loss and 2) examining the intended and unintended consequences 
for the dispossessed.34
In the case of mobile home parks, no clear strategy of dehumanization 
has been created to intentionally deprive mobile home residents of both prop-
erty and dignity. Nonetheless, states and localities have adopted exclusionary 
treatment of mobile home parks that is codified in the form of municipal 
ordinances and financing regulations.35 The discriminatory zoning and fi-
nancing of mobile homes act, to paraphrase Pierre Bourdieu, as a strategy
without a strategist..36 In other words, with marked consistency these regu-
lations position the mobile home park as a marginalized and substandard 
community form. Stigmatizing perceptions of the community form affects 
all members of the mobile home park and contributes to broader cultural 
perceptions of mobile home residents as marginal, mobile, and expendable.
The consequence for residents is a clear understanding of: a) their deg-
radation from full citizenship, b) their perceived role as expendable detritus, 
and c) the disposability of their communities in the interest of redevelop-
ment. These processes intersect to produce a marginalized class of residents 
33. Atuahene, supra note 20, at 172.
34. Atuahene, supra note 25, at 811–12.
35. For a fuller examination of regulatory barriers to manufactured housing see CASEY J. DAWKINS 
ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., REGULATORY BARRIERS TO MANUFACTURED HOUSING 
PLACEMENT IN URBAN COMMUNITIES (2011). 
36. PIERRE BOURDIEU & LOÏC J. D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY
(1992). 
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who lack full autonomy and rights. The process by which trailer trash is con-
structed—especially through the zoning and financing of mobile homes—
not only produces residents’ lack of right to their communities but also re-
produces their social stigma as trailer trash. Degraded to trash, and swept 
away in the cleansing of urban revitalization, these residents are dehuman-
ized and deemed disposable. These intersecting processes—those codified 
in zoning, practiced in financing, and reproduced in the designation of trailer 
trash—reveal the interplay of objective policies and subjective perceptions 
in the operation of dignity takings.
A. Zoning
The legacy of mobile home zoning and finance has been integral in con-
structing the marginality of the mobile home park. Municipal regulations 
have historically been used to prohibit, divide, and isolate parks from sur-
rounding communities and the effects of this are still felt today. Alongside 
marked growth in manufactured housing that began in the post-WWII era, 
was a marked increase in ordinances, resolutions, covenants, statues, and 
municipal regulations that restricted the placement of mobile homes and the 
development of mobile home parks.37 From 1966 to 1969, production of mo-
bile homes nearly doubled and one out of every two new single-family 
homes constructed in the United States was a mobile home, leading the au-
thor of a 1973 law review of mobile home park regulation to state, “[f]or a 
while it has become apparent that a large number of persons are willing to 
live in house trailers, it has become equally obvious that many people are 
unwilling to live near mobile homes, especially when they are concentrated 
in trailer parks.”38 Over the ensuing decades, as manufactured housing has 
continued to grow, zoning laws have been utilized as a solution.
In the 1970s, a majority of states authorized local municipalities and 
townships to regulate mobile homes within their jurisdictions; this set the 
stage for the regulatory treatment of mobile home parks for decades to fol-
low.39 Judicial decisions challenging these ordinances illustrate ingrained 
cultural perceptions of mobile home residents and had the effect of further 
institutionalizing their treatment as a secondary and subordinate class of cit-
izens. An Alaska case considering a private covenant to exclude mobile 
homes from a subdivision of conventional homes was upheld on the basis 
that using the land for a mobile home park would violate a covenant against 
37. MARGARET DRURY, MOBILE HOMES: THE UNRECOGNIZED REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
HOUSING (Praeger Publishers rev. ed. 1972) (1967).
38. Marvin M. Moore, The Mobile Home and The Law, 6 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2 (1973).
39. Id. at 1.
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“noxious or offensive trade or business.”40 A Colorado case called the do-
mesticity of mobile homes into questions, ruling that a private covenant 
could legally bar them because it held that land “will be used for dwelling 
houses only.”41 In Iowa, the court in Jones v. Berber stated that no “garage, 
trailer, shack or hut shall be used for living purposes.”42 In McBride v. Beh-
rman, the court upheld a covenant that banned trailers based on language that 
prohibited “temporary dwellings” and “unsightly structures” and counter-
poised them with the attractiveness and relative affluence of the existing 
community.43 The court noted,
In general, the court rulings of this period had the effect of defining the 
trailer as a temporary and mobile residence. Someone moving from place 
to place in a trailer was treated as a transient . . . . The ambiguity of these 
rulings reflects legal traditions that assume that proper dwellings are at-
tached to land.44
In the absence of a national ruling on exclusionary zoning of mobile 
homes, an array of approaches enacted by state and local governments has 
created a patchwork of restrictions and regulations the severely limit the lo-
cation of mobile home parks in practice. A 1980 national survey of zoning 
practices found the municipal techniques most commonly used to restrict the 
placement of mobile homes are: complete exclusion of manufactured hous-
ing, restriction of mobile homes to mobile home parks, and exclusion of mo-
bile homes from residential areas.45
Today, jurisdictions continue to restrict and direct the development of 
mobile home parks through a variety of planning and regulatory tools.46 His-
toric zoning processes that relegated mobile home parks to undesirable non-
residential areas have resulted in contemporary spatial arrangements in 
which parks remain “mislocated” in commercial and industrial districts.47 A
recent national study of metropolitan plans and regulations found that many 
40. Hallet v. Sumpter, 106 F. Supp, 996, 999 (D. Alaska 1952).
41. Pagel v. Gisi, 286 P.2d 636, 636 (Colo. 1955).
42. 103 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1960).
43. 272 N.E.2d 181, 188 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1971).
44. WALLIS, supra note 1, at 74*.
45. See ARTHUR D. BERNHARDT, BUILDING TOMORROW: THE MOBILE/MANUFACTURED HOUSING 
INDUSTRY (1980).
46. See generally ROLF PENDALL ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., FROM TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED:
A REVIEW OF THE LAND USE REGULATIONS IN THE NATION’S 50 LARGEST METROPOLITAN AREAS 
(2007), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/20060802_Pendall.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4ABE-P6E4]; Casey J. Dawkins & C. Theodore Koebel, Overcoming Barriers to Plac-
ing Manufactured Housing in Metropolitan Communities, 76 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 73 (2009).
47. WELFORD SANDERS, AM. PLAN. ASS’N, PAS 398, REGULATING MANUFACTURED HOUSING 4
(1986).
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jurisdictions had adopted restrictive or exclusionary regulations to discour-
age or prohibit the use of mobile homes.48 These processes restrict mobile 
home park residents from residential areas (the places where people live), 
and relegate them to industrial and commercial zones (the places where 
things are produced and exchanged).
B. Financing
While historic exclusionary zoning has continued to locate mobile 
home parks on inferior non-residential land, an equally damaging form of 
regulation has come from the treatment of manufactured homeownership as 
an inchoate or halfway mode of homeownership by 1) the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), which has refused to insure mortgages for mobile 
homes located in parks and 2) financing institutions that finance mobile 
homes as personal property.
The discriminatory financing of mobile homes stems from their origins 
as 1920s travel trailers and WWII-era temporary wartime housing. Since the 
1970s, manufacturers have almost exclusively designed mobile homes as 
permanent residences and increasingly large, complex, and immobile models 
are a product of the industry’s and residents’ expectation of permanence. 
Nonetheless, the mark of impermanence has continued to plague the mobile 
home to the present day and has barred mobile home park residents from 
mainstream housing finance and the protections that come with it: “The 
foundation of government support and subsidy for housing has been based 
on ‘permanence.’ Because of this commitment to permanence, and since the 
mobile home is considered a temporary unit, the government, for all practical 
purposes, disengaged itself from support of the mobile home unit.”49
Tellingly, as early as 1956, the FHA developed a program for insuring 
park lands under Section 207 of the Housing Act.50 It thereby protected park 
owners’ investments in their private property while leveraging the same 
property to exclude park residents from the full legal status of homeowner, 
refusing to insure loans on mobile homes.51 Later, the 1961 Housing Act 
provided park developers loans of $1800 per lot for park development.52 The 
48. See Dawkins & Koebel, supra note 46, at 74.
49. DRURY, supra note 37, at 131.
50. See Mortgage Insurance for Manufactured Home Parks: Section 207, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. &
URB. DEV., https://portal.hud.gov/hudpor-
tal/HUD?src=/program_offices/housing/mfh/progdesc/homepark207 [https://perma.cc/QPX5-2JUD].
51. DRURY, supra note 37, at 131.
52. Id.
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mobile homes located on these lots continue to be ineligible for such protec-
tion or support.
Due to restricted access to traditional mortgages, the vast majority of 
mobile homes are financed as private property through chattel loans which 
resemble automobile financing.53 These loans have shorter terms, higher in-
terest rates, higher default rates, and fewer consumer protections than tradi-
tional mortgages.54 The classification as private property means mobile 
homes are more vulnerable to predatory lending practices and that they de-
preciate each year like a car rather than appreciating like a site-built home.55
The negative impacts to the housing stability and wealth creation of low-
income households are immense. As housing scholars have argued:
We need to promote and codify an understanding that manufactured hous-
ing is not mobile, not chattel, not disposable, and not a special 
case . . . . Every housing advocate knows the gospel about homeowner-
ship . . . . If we believe it, we should ask ourselves why it is acceptable to 
overlook millions of owner-occupied, depreciating homes that are cut off 
from the rest of the housing stock in a parallel legal universe.56
As in the case of municipal zoning ordinances, these lending classifica-
tions have implications far beyond the financial, for all mobile home resi-
dents, whether they own or rent, whether then live in parks or on private land. 
The legal classification of mobile homes in parks as chattel, from the Latin 
word for “head” meaning the head of cattle, is based on its legal distinction 
from “real” property. This classification detaches a primary source of low-
income housing from the powerful associations related to home, hearth, and 
community. It dichotomizes real homes and mobile homes, stable commu-
nities and trailer parks, the local people and the trailer trash. The way we 
regulate translates into the way we perceive. The cultural effigy of the trailer 
park and the trailer trash living there is in part constructed through regula-
tion, which in turn ensures a separate, secondary, and dehumanized social 
status for mobile home residents.
53. See NAT’L COMM’N ON MANUFACTURED HOUS., FINAL REPORT 70 (1994).
54. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, MANUFACTURED-HOUSING CONSUMER FINANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 24 (2014), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_report_manufactured-hous-
ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/A5RW-UBL3].
55. See Lance George, Manufactured Housing, in NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., 2016
ADVOCATES GUIDE 6-9, 6-10 to 6-12 (2016).
56. Richard Genz, Why Advocates Need to Rethink Manufactured Housing, 12 HOUS. POL’Y
DEBATE 393, 408–09 (2001).
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C. Trailer Trash
The dehumanization of mobile home residents as trailer trash occurs 
from both the top down and the bottom up. From the top down, it occurs in 
the official city council meetings where the closures of parks are reviewed. 
In these meetings, residents encounter dominant tropes of their communities 
in the language and actions of city officials who embody (and publicly sanc-
tion) public perceptions and priorities.
In Jupiter, Florida, where Silver Sands was being redeveloped as a 
mixed-use luxury apartment and medical office space property, the devel-
oper needed to appear before the city council to request a rezoning change 
on the property from “mobile home park” into “mixed-use development.” 
By the time of the city council meeting in August of 2012, residents had been 
waiting months for the public hearing in the expressed hope that the council 
might acknowledge their concerns and deny the rezoning application.
Residents who came to speak during the public hearing first sat through 
the developer’s PowerPoint presentation, which was given to a receptive 
council. In the presentation, Silver Sands, a community of 130 households, 
some of which spanned generations of the same family and some of which 
had lived in the park for several decades, was reduced to the single phrase 
“130 mobile home sites.” No picture of Silver Sands was shown. Instead, the 
developer showed several full color slides depicting beautifully rendered de-
sign images of the property that would replace their community. Silver Sands 
resident Richard expressed how he felt seeing these images and the city 
council’s positive reaction to the development which would replace his home 
of ten years:
[The developer] is showing everybody pictures of what it’s going to look 
like. Who the hell cares? They’re going to kick you out what difference 
does it make what it’s going to look like?! Here’s the beautiful place you 
can’t live in.
In the end, after months of waiting and hoping the city council would 
not approve the rezoning of their community, the council not only approved 
the rezoning change but also expressed satisfaction that the redevelopment 
of Silver Sands into middle-class “workforce housing” would be beneficial 
for the city. The Mayor asks the council if they are satisfied from both the 
verbal and written presentation. All of the members of council agree they are 
satisfied. There is very little discussion on this point. The Mayor announces 
that they have consensus within one minute. Next, they vote on the future 
land-use change from residential to commercial. The Mayor says: “Overall 
the opportunity to have additional workforce housing is very important to us. 
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That is a great location for the reasons that we heard. So I think that it’s going 
to be quite good!” The city council votes unanimously in favor of the zoning 
change and eviction of all Silver Sands residents.
In Alvin, Texas, similar perceptions of mobile home park residents 
were expressed by the local city council who had instituted a new mobile 
home park ordinance that required all of the city’s decades-old mobile home 
parks make costly upgrades to be “up to code” or else close down. The city 
council held several meetings where landlords requested variances to the 
code, citing prohibitive costs and pleading that they would be forced to evict 
residents as a result. The attorney for the city herself lamented that some of 
the requirements of the new ordinance (for example, the requirement that all 
parks be enclosed with an eight-foot fence) were not only prohibitively 
costly for the town’s “mom and pop” landlords but also that they were not 
meant to improve health and safety in the parks. Instead they were designed 
to visually remove the sight of parks from non-mobile home residents of the 
town: “Some of them [the code requirements] are not helping safety; some 
are aesthetic.” The city attorney further explained:
I think what happened was that some people got on city council and they 
said: the place is all trashed, the city is trashed, there’s trailers every-
where . . . you could say, I own a nice house next to a trailer park, this is 
an example, if it is shut down my property will have better property value 
than if it is not.
In Trails’ End, as in Silver Sands, the city council process reduced res-
idents to their material homes. The Alvin city council debated over how 
many homes could be left behind for the property to no longer be considered 
a mobile home park. They decided on the arbitrary number of three homes, 
meaning three structures. Because of this arbitrary distinction, generations 
of families living in Alvin parks were split up. In their efforts to get up to 
code, landlords made determinations about which three households could 
stay based on the quality and appearance of the homes, not the characteristics 
or needs of the people within the homes. In Trail’s End, Lupe and her hus-
band as well as her mother and father were able to stay in their park and in 
their homes, along with one other household who lived in a newer model 
mobile home. Lupe’s sister, Ana, was evicted from Trail’s End and forced 
to move her older, more dilapidated mobile home to a park outside of town 
in the county jurisdiction. She said the hardest part of the move was being 
cut off from her family.
In both states, these city council processes both revealed and officially 
sanctioned the secondary status of mobile home park residents. Silver Sand’s 
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resident Kathleen had spoken during public comment to her local city coun-
cil. She hoped that expressing her love for her home of ten years and detail-
ing the difficulty of moving herself (confined to a wheelchair after the 
amputation of her leg at the hip) and her disabled husband might influence 
the council’s decision. After attending the city council meeting, Kathleen 
discussed the process with her husband Chip:
Kathleen: It’s too late. It’s a done deal.
Chip: What I was hoping for was that the Town of Jupiter would make it 
tough for them. But the Town of Jupiter—and Palm Beach County—
doesn’t want trailer parks. You can tell that. Since we lived here, how 
many trailer parks have closed up? Three?
Chip names the three trailer parks that have closed in this area. Kathleen 
says softly that the reason that people don’t like mobile home parks is be-
cause they’ve never been inside a mobile home. They just see them on the 
outside and they think the people that live in them are trailer trash. Kathleen 
points out: “It’s sad but the community wants us out of here. They just don’t 
want a trailer park.” Kathleen tells Chip that what is so sad to her is the way 
that “the community has not backed us up,” pointing out that many people 
in Silver Sands give to local charities or belong to churches and none of these 
organizations have made any attempts to help the residents of the park. In 
her perception the local council and the broader community have remained 
silent in the face of their removal. Kathleen says: “This is what really bothers 
me.”
The process of dehumanization occurs from the top down in the official 
language of city councils that reduce park residents to their physical homes, 
and then deem these homes undesirable, unsightly, and disposable. In doing 
so they not only dehumanize mobile home residents but they remove the 
ethical dilemma of evicting poor, elderly, or otherwise vulnerable people. 
This process of dehumanization also occurs from the ground up, as residents 
recognize their secondary status, identify themselves as trailer trash, and feel 
a diminished sense of autonomy and power.
Mattie points out that she was not really surprised when she received 
the notice that her city was considering rezoning Silver Sands and evicting 
over one hundred of her neighbors. She explains that she was also not sur-
prised by the city council’s evident desire to replace her mobile home park 
with more “acceptable” forms of housing:
We’ve been living here 20 years and when we came here that was just a 
two lane road out here. And as they kept building, we figured, the land 
was good. It’s property that people naturally want to build on. And as we 
know they don’t want trailers, campgrounds, whatever you want to call 
them, mobile homes. They don’t want them in the town. Now this is an 
upscale town.
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. . . .
I think that they think that the people that live in mobile homes are not 
wealthy enough or do not have enough money for enough income or a 
good enough job to be average citizens. I think that’s why this company 
[the development company] can mess over so many people. They think 
that they don’t have any rights or that they can’t protest for what they want. 
That kind of stuff.
. . . .
It’s scary when you stop and think about it. When you have been settled 
and you own your own home and you think everything is going nice and 
smooth and everything, then all the sudden somebody says: Get out. Well, 
how am I going? Where am I going to? What’s it gonna cost me? Will I 
like the place I’m going to? One question after another. And you can’t find 
out! That’s the way it is. [Sighs.] Yeah.
Mattie articulates the confusion and powerlessness she faced as her park 
began to close. She also articulates a sense of disposability, loss of auton-
omy, and lack of full personhood that she associates with being a mobile
home park resident. This sense of disposability and powerless was driven 
home by the physical relocation of her home.
As a researcher, I had anticipated that the moment of receiving the evic-
tion notice and the process of speaking at city council would be most salient 
for residents. I did not anticipate the primacy that the physical move of the 
home would have. Through the lens of dignity takings, however, there are 
clear parallels between park residents witnessing their homes being hauled 
away on the back of a semi-truck and Soweto residents witnessing of the 
bulldozing of their former homes.57 In these moments the full impact to res-
idents’ indignation was laid bare. Park residents told me repeatedly that the 
experience of seeing their home being “pulled down the road” was unnerv-
ing, demeaning, and painful.
We’ve been standing outside Walter’s home for the better part of the 
day, waiting as it is hitched to the truck. Walter’s daughter-in-law, Gail (who 
lives down the street in her own mobile home) has come to join us. Finally, 
around 3:00 p.m. Walter’s home starts to move. It comes towards us trailing 
behind the large semi-truck. We are all silent as the truck, the house, and 
then the escort car drives by with lights flashing and a wide load banner hung 
across its back. As the home turns the corner down the main road that leads 
out of Silver Sands, we silently pile into Gail’s minivan, pulling behind the 
caravan. We go about thirty miles per hour as we drive behind the trailer the 
whole way. Gail whispers as she concentrates on driving: “Surreal.” Though 
57. ATUAHENE, supra note 5, at 38–42.
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both Gail’s and Walter’s households have been packing and disassembling 
their homes for months, including serious physical labor like removing the 
large screened-in porch additions that ran the length of both their sin-
glewides, Walter mentions for the first time how exhausted he feels. He’s 
surprised by the toll this day has taken on him: “I’m all worn out and I ain’t 
done nothing.” Gail states: “That’s when Matthew and I started noticing that 
we were actually tired, was the day our trailer actually got moved.”
Tabitha summarized this experience more tersely, explaining: “This 
whole thing is not settling. Watching your home be pulled down the street, 
crooked.” These residents’ visceral response to seeing their homes being 
hauled away speaks to the deep “unsettling” produced by the visible sight of 
their home torn from its foundation, by the material expression of their own 
disposability. That this became the most salient feature of the eviction for 
some residents demonstrates that beyond the practical and financial costs of 
eviction, the loss of dignity was a primary cost.
Traffic flowed freely by Walter’s home as he followed behind it with 
Gail in the minivan, and she whispered: “Surreal.” Local charities and 
churches remained silent in the face of their own members’ eviction and 
Kathleen mused: “The community has not backed us up . . . . That’s what 
really bothers me.” Sammy summarized the treatment of his family and 
neighbors by the developer, the landlord, and the local city officials by stat-
ing blankly: “We’re trailer trash to them.”
Trash. The word encapsulates the disposability of mobile home park 
residents and the communities they call home. It also encapsulates a broader 
process by which urban redevelopment privileges some residents (and their 
claim to place) while dehumanizing and dispossessing others. The very pro-
cess of urban redevelopment and revitalization is a process of taking out the 
trash, what sociologist Loïc Wacquant calls “the cleansing of the built envi-
ronment and the streets from the physical and human detritus wrought by 
economic deregulation and welfare retrenchment.”58 Within this framework 
the mass evictions that occur when mobile home parks are redeveloped must 
be understood as a community-wide exercise in dignity taking.
IV. REAL LOSS AND SYMBOLIC HURT
The possibility of dignity restoration for mobile home park residents 
requires more than simple compensation for what residents have lost. Tell-
ingly, in both Texas and Florida, residents expressed a similar loss of dignity, 
58. Loïc Wacquant, Relocating Gentrification: The Working Class, Science, and the State in Recent 
Urban Research, 32 INT’L J. URB. & REGIONAL RES. 198, 199 (2008).
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a similar sense of being demoted to “trash,” even though state statutes in 
Florida require monetary compensation for relocation paid to residents to 
defray the cost of their move. The Florida statutes have organized a perma-
nent trust fund through which evicted mobile home park residents receive 
payment in the form of a voucher (to be redeemed by a licensed mobile home 
mover) in the amount of $3000 for a singlewide mobile home and $6000 for 
a doublewide mobile home.59 In Texas, state statutes do not mandate any 
form of compensation or assistance for residents when their parks are closed 
and they are evicted.60
Despite this difference in legally mandated financial compensation, res-
idents in both states experienced their eviction through a similar emotional 
framework. In its most raw form, the emotional impact of the evictions was 
expressed as a deep sense of sadness and hurt. Trail’s End resident, Eunice 
summarized the experience: “On learning the news I was surprised, I didn’t 
expect it,” Eunice says. She has lived in the park for seven years. She re-
members that when she first heard the news she felt “a lot of sadness.” She 
recalls that her children and her husband were all feeling the same way, sad 
mainly. Eunice’s neighbor tells Eunice that when she learned that her park 
would close: “Duele, se Duele.” She felt simply hurt, it hurt.
Rachel, a young resident of Trail’s End, was overcome by this hurt in 
the days immediately after her family of six was evicted. Overwhelmed, Ra-
chel explained: “I think that this is why there is a lot of suicide. I think this 
is why people do suicide, because right now you are just depressed . . . . You 
want to kill yourself. I mean, it hurts. Oh. I’m gonna cry. It hurts.”
Silver Sands resident Lois had a more bodily experience of this hurt. 
During the eviction process she began taking five milligrams of Oxycodone 
in both the morning and evening. This troubled her, since regulating her use 
of the drug had long been important to her. She used to attend a pain man-
agement clinic, but she cut her ties with the clinic when she felt the doctor 
was pressuring her to increase her dose. Yet, during the eviction she began 
increasing her own dose because she felt constant pain. She explained: “But 
with all this, the pain is back in my stomach. I am taking two pills in the 
morning and two at night. Now I took the pill an hour and a half ago and my 
stomach still hurts. So you can imagine how much it hurt before I took it.” 
Silver Sands resident Paula also turned to substances to dull the pain she felt, 
so much so that she ran out of the pain pills she was prescribed for a back 
injury. She said, “I’ve been a basket case.” Though she had never been a big 
59. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 723.0612 (West 2017).
60. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 94.201–206 (West 2017).
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drinker, without her pain medication she had been taking Aleve or Motrin 
and drinking a beer or two at night to “at least try and function.”
During the eviction (and due in part to Florida’s system of providing 
voucherized relocation assistance) Silver Sands resident Walter encountered 
outsiders’ views of himself and his community. After one recent interaction, 
Walter used his characteristic dark humor to express the hurt of encountering 
demeaning perceptions of mobile home residents. Walter notes:
And I was feeling so good! Here I am, I thought I was looking so good. I 
put on a clean shirt every three or four days, change my socks once in a 
while and shower here and there. I can drive a car and all that stuff. And I 
thought damn, I’m pretty high up. Come to find out I ain’t nothing. It is 
funny yeah, but it’s also kind of serious too—not that people say all that 
stuff about how I should know my level, but it’s just kind of sorry that 
people think that way. That’s the thing that hurts.
The experience of hurt, a sense of indignity in one of its rawest forms, 
was shared by residents across Texas and Florida, in contexts where they 
received state compensation or where they did not. Their common emotional 
experience of eviction speaks to a more fundamental dignity taking that oc-
curred over and above their loss of community. This common experience 
may seem counterintuitive through the lens of property rights and the eco-
nomic value of property. Through that lens residents might be expected to 
be up in arms, feeling a sense of injustice, fighting for their rights. However, 
through the lens of dignity takings, the layers of sadness, humiliation, and 
hurt they felt overshadowed these other emotions. In short, the sense of in-
dignity became most salient and may have even acted to dampen their polit-
ical activism.
V. CONCLUSIONS—SOCIAL PROPERTY AND COLLECTIVE DIGNITY
RESTITUTION
The insights from inside closing mobile home parks contribute to our 
understanding of dignity takings in important ways. They broaden the very 
concept of property, and point to the need to examine the practical, emo-
tional, and symbolic experience of property loss when evaluating dignity 
takings. They also highlight that this experience of loss not only produces 
static emotional states—anger, sadness, indignity—but also produces hurt 
and harmed subjectivities that may preclude further political action among 
the dispossessed.
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Struggles over property are both material and representational, as urban 
residents’ battles over gentrification in their neighborhoods show.61 As Atua-
hene’s South African case also demonstrated, even in cases where residents 
did not legally own land due to apartheid they were nonetheless subject to 
dignity takings when evicted from long-time neighborhoods.62 The feelings 
of hurt expressed by residents in both Texas and Florida highlight the limits 
of strictly legal dimensions of property rights and point to a need to better 
understand social definitions of property.
According to geographer Nicholas Blomley, the meaning of property 
has long appeared to be settled by legal definitions that highlight rights of 
ownership and exclusion: “Property is imagined here as private property, 
with the solitary owner exercising exclusionary rights over a bounded space. 
While property may be public (that is, held by the state), it is rarely imagined 
as collective . . . . It encourages a view of property as nonsocial; that is, as 
concerned with relations between people and things, thus obscuring prop-
erty’s effect on social relations of power.”63 Indeed this hegemonic under-
standing of property excludes social definitions of property, like those 
generated from the ground up by residents’ practical experience of their 
homes and communities. This is important not simply to social scientists ex-
amining the social implications of property loss, but to legal scholars inter-
ested in foundational understanding of property. After all, legal theory has 
long sought to distinguish property from “thing-ownership,”64 stating “prop-
erty is not things, but rights, rights in or to things.”65 Returning to founda-
tional legal understandings of property as rights necessitates addressing 
residents’ collective rights to the places they call home.
Yet, social definitions of property cannot include everything. Arguing 
that social property is everything risks reducing the concept to nothing. The 
case of mobile home park dispossessions highlights key elements that shape 
the practical experience of property. These elements of social property in-
clude: 1) temporality, 2) sweat equity, and 3) identity.
In the mobile home park, the temporality of residents’ land tenure 
shaped their practical experience of their community as their own. This is 
not to say that only long-term residents had property rights in Trail’s End 
61. See, e.g., Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes of Property, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 567, 568 (1998).
62. ATUAHENE, supra note 5, at 30.
63. NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, UNSETTLING THE CITY: URBAN LAND AND THE POLITICS OF PROPERTY,
at xiv–xv (2004).
64. Blomley, supra note 61, at 572.
65. PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 2 (C. B. MacPherson ed., 1978).
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and Silver Sands. The expectations and experiences of even shorter term res-
idents were shaped by neighbors who had lived in the parks for decades, 
some since the parks first opened in the 1950s. The vector of temporality 
goes both ways, the long-term residency of many park residents shaped the 
future expectations of those like Richard and Ron, who said, “I thought I was 
going to die here.”
Over time, residents invested in property, and their sweat equity trans-
formed their practical experience of home. Though they acknowledged their 
lots were not legally theirs, the very practice of extending their homes 
through porches, extra rooms and additions transformed their understanding 
of the land under their homes and led residents to argue, like Tabitha did:
“Not that it [the land] was mine, but I felt it was part of the house. I thought 
it was part of the house. I felt it was part of the house.”
Finally, in the mobile home park property loss is collective. While the 
threat to property is facilitated by a collective social identity, trailer trash, the 
claim to property comes from resisting this collective identity through a self-
conscious pride in their communities. This pride also affected residents’ abil-
ity to resettle in new parks. Though their homes were transported, residents 
described a deep-felt loss of community and social ties. As Kathleen ex-
plained in her new park: “I’m not happy . . . I don’t know anybody. Down 
there everybody knew everybody.” As Larry lamented after leaving, “Eve-
rything was just so beautiful there, so great . . . . It’s not going to be the same. 
No matter where you go, it’s not going to the same.”
This points to a process fundamental to dignity restoration. When dig-
nity takings result in community destruction, dignity restoration must occur 
at the community scale. When dehumanization or infantilization targets a 
collective identity, as in the social construction of trailer trash, dignity resto-
ration must occur at the collective scale. Doing so in the case of evicted mo-
bile home park residents requires envisioning alternative definitions of 
property, name collective or social property. It also requires imagining alter-
native community forms, including collective ownership through alternative 
land holdings such as cooperative parks, community land trusts, or public 
ownership.
Indeed, the primary national non-profit working to address mobile 
home park mass evictions, ROC (Resident Owned Communities) USA, does 
so by working with residents to submit competing purchase offers for rede-
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veloping parks and converting parks to collective ownership, thus guaran-
teeing lands cannot be sold out from under residents.66 The legal work of 
non-profits like ROC USA to create resident-owned communities transforms 
the social property of parks into legitimized communal property.
What is important about this work is not only that it offers one solution 
to the halfway homeownership found in parks, but that it also reveals how 
process is key in dignity restoration. Recall that in the Florida case residents 
did receive some financial compensation but monetary reparations did not 
mitigate the hurt and harm they felt. Because dignity restoration incorporates 
principles of redistributive justice, it “seeks to rehabilitate the dispossessed 
and reintegrate them into the fabric of society to through an emphasis on 
process.”67 Residents of parks converted to resident ownership describe how 
the very process of converting their park into resident ownership is empow-
ering. For instance, in a Minnesota ROC USA park called Park Plaza one 
resident described feeling “very scared” before the process began. Another 
resident worried: “We’re common folk, where are we gonna come up with 
$4.3 million [to purchase the park]?”68 After receiving loan counseling, 
forming a co-op, receiving training to manage finances, and learning to use 
Robert’s Rules of Order to manage park projects, residents no longer ap-
proached collaborative park management with fear, instead they felt empow-
ered: “Everybody has a voice, you own a little piece of where you live.”69
Converting private poverty housing models like mobile home parks to col-
lective affordable housing through cooperative ownership is just one exam-
ple of how dignity restoration might be accomplished through attention to 
community-wide process. These residents’ experience of empowerment 
highlights the efficacy of dignity restoration that targets collective identities 
and affirms social property.
66. ROC USA is a non-profit social enterprise that offers financing, training and networking to 
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